In Rebutting the Dilemma of Evil: The Proof of Wisdom and the Necessity of Free Will

A Rational Philosophical Approach in the Light of the Qur’anic Vision
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The dilemma of evil is one of the most common philosophical issues used in contemporary atheist discourse to challenge the idea of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God. It is often presented as a logical contradiction between three issues: God’s omnipotence, God’s omnibenevolence, and the existence of evil in the world. However, in my view, this argument is not based on a careful analysis of the concept of God itself, a coherent understanding of the nature of evil, or an adequate recognition of the limits of human reason and its ontological position within the cosmic order. In this article, I seek to deconstruct this dilemma from its roots and reconstruct a rational and coherent conception of evil based on the principle of divine wisdom, the limitations of human cognition, and the necessity of free will to achieve moral meaning.
First: On Deconstructing the Rationale for the Problem of Evil
The classical atheistic argument, as formulated by J. L. Mackie, is presented as a proof of the logical contradiction between the existence of God and the existence of evil. (J. L. Mackie) or as attributed to the so-called “Epicurus Paradox”, is presented as a proof of the logical contradiction between the existence of God and the existence of evil. This argument is based on the implicit assumption that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being must, by definition, prevent every possible evil, otherwise it would be impotent or ungood. However, this assumption is not based on rational necessity, but on a reductionist conception of the concept of divine goodness that empties it of its essential dimension: Wisdom.
According to both the Qur’anic and rational conceptualization, God is not just an absolute power that moves aimlessly, but a wise actor, meaning that His actions are not just mechanical responses to eliminate pain, but intentional actions within an integrated holistic system. It is a requirement of wisdom that pain and evil be allowed to exist in order to achieve greater good that would otherwise be unattainable. Allowing pain is not a sign of the absence of good, but may be a sign of the presence of a higher purpose.
The medical example clearly illustrates this point: The surgeon allows the pain of the scalpel, not because he is evil, but because he seeks to save the patient’s life. Pain is not an end, but a means. By the same token, divine goodness cannot rationally be reduced to the prevention of pain alone, but must be understood within a broader purposive framework.
Thus, the claim of a logical contradiction between the existence of God and the existence of evil collapses once the element of wisdom is introduced into the analysis.
II: On the nature of evil: Is it intrinsic or extrinsic?
Traditional Islamic philosophers, such as al-Farabi and Avicenna, approached evil as a lack of perfection rather than a self-contained existence. For them, evil is not an independently created essence, but rather a contingent state arising from the inadequacy or incomplete capacity of existents to achieve perfect goodness.
However, I believe that this definition, while relevant, does not exhaust the reality of evil in terms of its ontological function. Evil is not an “imperfection”, but – from a broader perspective – a logical tool necessary to achieve gradual perfection within a system based on inequality and difference.
Good is perceived only in opposition to the possibility of evil, just as light is perceived only in opposition to darkness, and sight is perceived only in opposition to blindness. These binaries are not absurd contradictions, but cognitive structures that make meaning possible.
Evil is not something intrinsically created by God, but a natural consequence of the creation of a hierarchical world, a world based on difference, competition, interaction, and experience. God created existence, and evil is a symptom of good, arising from the limits of constraints, the clash of interests within the material world, and the conditions of human freedom.
To say that God “created evil” as an independent essence is a conceptual confusion, because evil is not an ontological entity like an atom or a galaxy, but rather a characterization of a relationship, state, or outcome within a larger system.
III: Leibniz and the best possible world
I find the thesis of the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) to be a very important philosophical addition to understanding the question of evil from a coherent logical perspective. Leibniz argued that the world we live in is the “best of all possible worlds,” not in the sense that it is free of evil, but in the sense that it achieves the highest possible degree of perfection within the conditions of cosmic possibility.
Everything that happens in the universe has a justifiable cause, and God chooses one world over another only for a reason related to the overall perfection of the cosmic order. A world without evil, but devoid of freedom, responsibility, and moral meaning, would be an existentially worthless world, no matter how “comfortable” it may seem.
A world that contains a measure of evil, but allows for freedom, choice, material and moral development, and responsibility, is – in the balance of wisdom – better than a rigid world that is devoid of pain but also devoid of meaning.
Thus, the existence of evil is not evidence against God’s wisdom, but may be a condition for the maximum possible good in a world of choice and progression.
IV: The Illusion of “Free Evil” and the Limits of Human Perception
Some contemporary philosophers, such as William Rowe, invoke the idea of “free evil,” that is, evils that do not seem to have a clear moral justification, to conclude that the existence of God is unlikely. At its core, however, this reasoning is based on a fundamental epistemological fallacy: The confusion between “not recognizing wisdom” and “not having wisdom”.
The human mind is governed by time and space, and can only see partial segments of the cosmic scene. Divine knowledge, on the other hand, is comprehensive, transient, and encompasses both distant and near outcomes. What appears to us as pure evil at a limited moment in time may be a necessary link in a causal chain leading to a greater good years or centuries later or in another context that we do not see.
This analysis is consistent with the Qur’anic view that emphasizes the limitations of human knowledge:
And you may hate something that is good for you.”
Judging an event as “absolute evil” is a hasty judgment stemming from cognitive deficiencies, not from conclusive intellectual proof. This is the same profound philosophical idea crystallized in the story of Moses and the good servant.
V: Free will as the basis for moral goodness
I realize that true moral goodness can only be achieved under true freedom. A coerced act has no moral value, because morality presupposes choice, responsibility, and the ability to act or leave.
If human beings were forced to do good, goodness would have no meaning, reward would have no value, and justice would have no justification. This is why the Qur’an emphasizes the principle of freedom:
Freedom entails the possibility of deviation, and moral evil is the existential price that is logically necessary to grant human beings the dignity of choice. This is what Alvin Plantinga accurately expressed when he determined that creating a world of free beings who always choose good by force is a logical contradiction, because freedom by its very nature opens the door to error.
Hence I understand moral evil as the “symptom of freedom,” just as darkness is the symptom of light, rather than an independent essence.
VI: Suffering and meaning-making
The Qur’an does not view pain as vain, but as a tool for testing and building:
We will test you with something of fear, hunger, and loss of wealth, lives, and fruits.
Suffering is not an existential punishment, but a mechanism for making meaning, discerning attitudes, and crystallizing moral consciousness. This world is a house of testing, not a house of reward, and absolute justice is deferred to the hereafter.
A world without pain is necessarily devoid of heroism, patience, upward mobility, responsibility, and progression toward perfection. It is a world without a moral story, without meaning.
Conclusion
I conclude from this analysis that:
Evil is not a created essence, but a logical tool for progression to perfection.
The current world is the best under the conditions of freedom and responsibility.
Human perception is limited from seeing perfect wisdom.
Freedom entails the possibility of error.
Suffering creates the moral meaning of existence.
Therefore, the existence of evil is not evidence against the existence of God, but rather confirms the existence of freedom and justice deferred. The demand for a world without pain and testing is a demand for a world without logic and meaning, an emotional demand, not a logical one.


